When are purely predictive models best? by Northcott, Robert
Disputatio, Vol. IX, No. 47, December 2017
Received: 05/09/2017 Accepted: 02/11/2017
© 2017 Northcott. Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License
When are Purely Predictive Models Best?
Robert Northcott
Birkbeck College, University of London
BIBLID [0873-626X (2017) 47; pp. 631–656]
DOI: 10.1515/disp-2017-0021
Abstract
Can purely predictive models be useful in investigating causal sys-
tems? I argue “yes”. Moreover, in many cases not only are they useful, 
they are essential. The alternative is to stick to models or mechanisms 
drawn from well-understood theory. But a necessary condition for ex-
planation is empirical success, and in many cases in social and field 
sciences such success can only be achieved by purely predictive mod-
els, not by ones drawn from theory. Alas, the attempt to use theory 
to achieve explanation or insight without empirical success therefore 
fails, leaving us with the worst of both worlds—neither prediction nor 
explanation. Best go with empirical success by any means necessary. I 
support these methodological claims via case studies of two impressive 
feats of predictive modelling: opinion polling of political elections, and 
weather forecasting.
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1 Introduction
Many areas of science have prioritized the development of theory and 
mechanisms with the aim of using them to explain messy and hard-
to-predict field phenomena. In this paper I criticize this widespread 
methodological approach, arguing that instead we should prioritize 
empirical success—even though it may be difficult, and even if it 
means foregoing explanation. In the best cases, we can achieve both 
empirical success and explanation. But in many other cases we can-
not, and then it is better to aim for empirical success without expla-
nation than vice versa. Indeed, we have no choice: the possibility of 
achieving explanation without empirical success is an illusion, and 
moreover a harmful one insofar as it diverts effort away from the at-
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tempt to achieve empirical success. In some of the unpromising cases 
it does turn out to be possible to achieve both empirical success and 
explanation after all, at least to a degree—but only via the route of 
empirical success first.
In many cases the only route to empirical success is via purely 
predictive models, i.e. models that do not attempt to capture a situa-
tion’s causal structure and thus that may not deliver (causal) explana-
tions. In these cases, purely predictive models are best.
I support these claims with two case studies of notable predic-
tive success, namely forecasting of political elections and of weather. 
They reinforce the methodological lesson that (at least sometimes) 
predictive success should be prioritized over theory development 
and that, contrary to hopes, theory development cannot provide a 
shortcut to explanation without successful prediction first. After go-
ing through the case studies (sections 3 to 5), I return to the issue 
of prediction versus explanation and also consider the possibility of 
explanation via historical rather than forward-looking empirical suc-
cess (sections 6 to 8).
2 Prediction versus explanation
Begin with a familiar and simple example: a Newtonian model of a 
cannonball dropped from a tower. Using this model, we may predict 
the acceleration of the ball and, thus, the time it takes to reach the 
ground. These predictions turn out to be very accurate. The model 
is causal: in particular, it describes how the Earth’s gravity causally 
influences the ball’s motion. Thus it gives a causal explanation of the 
ball’s trajectory. Thus also, it is generalizable to many new cases—
such as if the ball were a little heavier, or dropped from a different 
tower, or dropped at night rather than during the day.
Such a model is a paradigm case of idealization: it isolates and dis-
torts particular causal factors and then uses its analysis of those fac-
tors to explain a real-world target, even though that target may con-
tain many other factors that the model ignores. Here, the Newtonian 
model takes the ball and the Earth to be point masses, air resistance 
to be negligible, and so on. Taken literally, it is therefore false. Yet, 
as many philosophers of science have argued, idealized and therefore 
false models can nevertheless be explanatory. We do not need to go 
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into the details of why; roughly, they all come down to the same ver-
dict: idealized models can be explanatory when their falsity does not 
matter, i.e. when the idealizations are true enough for, say, predic-
tive accuracy.1 In our Newtonian case, the key vindicating feature is 
the accuracy of the model’s predictions—it is this that gives warrant 
to its causal representation and thus to its causal explanations. It is 
also what gives warrant to the model’s generalization to new con-
texts, since the causal structure it identifies is presumed to extrapo-
late. Whether the model will remain predictively accurate in a new 
context is then a matter of whether that context features significant 
other, disturbing causes unrepresented by the model. But even if for 
this reason the model is no longer predictively accurate, nevertheless 
we may still have warrant to accept that it truly identifies some of the 
causes present—if we have reason to think that the modeled causes 
continue to operate even in the presence of the unmodeled ones.
But this is the easy case, philosophically speaking: a causal model 
with empirical success, and which therefore offers both explanation 
and generalization. It is true that there are many such easy cases. But 
it is also true that there are many difficult ones. In particular, pre-
dictive success is often elusive. Indeed, this is arguably typically so in 
social sciences and in field sciences more generally.2 What should we 
do then? This is where there is a great methodological split.
One common response, from philosophers and scientists alike, is 
that, roughly speaking, we should give priority to explanation over 
prediction. A long tradition, for instance, has doubted that system-
atic predictive success (or empirical success generally) in social sci-
ence is possible. Among the reasons offered why not are: that social 
systems are open, i.e. are chronically subject to significant influences 
from non-social factors that are inevitably unmodeled by social sci-
ence; that social systems exhibit reflexivity, i.e. that models them-
selves may influence their subject matter, thus creating a moving 
target; or simply that typically there are too many variables needing 
to be modeled (Taylor 1971, Giddens 1976, Hacking 1995, Lawson 
1 See, for instance, work by Nancy Cartwright, Daniel Hausman, Uskali Mäki, 
Michael Strevens, and Michael Weisberg. For an overview, see Weisberg 2013.
2 By ‘field sciences’ I mean non-laboratory investigations of systems that are 
not engineered artefacts.
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1997). This pessimism has been bolstered by the great difficulty in 
practice of achieving predictive success. Thus, for instance, it has 
proved notoriously difficult to forecast what GDP or the unemploy-
ment rate will be in 12 months, who will win an election in six 
months, or (to cite a field but not social science) what the weather 
will be in one month.
In the face of this apparent impossibility, or at least great diffi-
culty, of prediction, it has been argued that the goal of science should 
change: instead of prediction, it should instead be explanation. And 
the route to such explanation is the development of theory. Even in 
the absence of predictive success, it is held, such an approach offers 
the promise of understanding and insight. Indeed, such an achieve-
ment is often thought to be superior to mere predictive success, even 
when the latter is possible. The reason is that predictive success (or 
empirical success generally) in any particular case may require ac-
count to be taken of all factors, no matter how transient or sui ge-
neris. But what is of greater interest is those factors or theoretical 
structures that generalize. It is the task of science, as a pursuit of 
systematic knowledge, to discover and isolate the latter. In the case 
of economics, for instance, we might be interested in a particular 
structure of choices and incentives, such as the Prisoner’s Dilem-
ma, because we understand this structure, and the outcomes to be 
expected from it, in terms of the discipline’s fundamental building 
block of constrained agent rational choice, and because we think this 
structure crops up in many different places. Therefore, rather than 
get lost in local details it is more fruitful to focus on the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma structure—even though it may predict accurately in hardly 
any particular cases. The analogy is with the methodological role 
of mechanisms in other sciences, such as neuroscience. Explanation 
in neuroscience, many philosophers have persuasively argued, is via 
appeal to mechanisms that, analogously to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
are well understood and generalizable (Machamer et al 2000 and 
many others). Accordingly, just as in neuroscience, it is knowledge 
of mechanisms that enables true explanation and understanding in 
social science and field sciences generally, and our efforts should be 
allocated accordingly. It is knowledge of mechanisms, and the theory 
that underwrites it, that provides the understanding of any empiri-
cal success that we might achieve—and also provides understanding 
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even in the many cases when our empirical success is imperfect.3 Or 
so the argument goes.
Accordingly, there has been much philosophical support for the 
view that development of theory and mechanisms, rather than em-
pirical or predictive accuracy, should be the primary goal of social 
science (Lawson 1997, Brante 2001, Elster 1989, Little 1991).4 More 
than that, implicitly there has been much support too for this view 
from scientists themselves. The practice of economics, for instance, 
has been to develop a suite of formal models and then to apply these 
models as best we can to particular real-world targets, even knowing 
that rarely will they be fully accurate predictively. Usually, at least 
implicitly, such models are given a causal interpretation.5
So that is one response to the difficulty of prediction. Now turn to 
a different response—one that rejects a methodological emphasis on 
mechanisms and underlying theory (Cartwright 2007, Reiss 2008). 
One version of this response, motivated in part by case studies of em-
pirical successes, has emphasized instead context-specific and extra-
theoretical work, arguing that theories and mechanisms play at most a 
heuristic role (Alexandrova 2008, Alexandrova and Northcott 2009).
In this paper, I will investigate a specific variant of this alternative 
to the mechanist program. It advocates, roughly speaking, prioritiz-
ing prediction over explanation.6 According to it, we should concen-
trate on achieving predictive success even if that means abandoning 
or moving beyond established theoretical models. This therefore of-
fers the opposite methodological advice to that of the mechanists, 
and so in many cases implies a critique of scientific practice. The 
chief drawback of this alternative approach is that, because there 
3 There is a literature on whether “understanding”, “insight” and the like have 
any epistemic value over and above explanation, but I will not address that here. I 
also do not commit myself to any particular definition of “mechanism”.
4 ‘The proper function of a social science … is not prediction but diagnosis.’ 
(Runciman 1963: 17).
5 Rodrik 2015 is a recent—and widely admired—articulation of this typical 
economist view.
6 Of course, in practice prediction and explanation inform each other and are 
often closely related (Douglas 2009). Indeed, I will return to their relation later. 
Nevertheless, there remains a distinct methodological split.
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may be no causal model underpinning a successful prediction, so we 
cannot offer any explanation of the predictive successes that we do 
achieve. Nor can we easily generalize from them in order to achieve 
predictive success in other cases too, including using them to assess 
hypothetical or counterfactual cases.
I will examine two examples of field phenomena that are highly 
complex but that have nevertheless been predicted successfully: po-
litical elections, and the weather. After looking at the methods used 
to achieve these successes, the lesson I will draw from them is that, 
contrary to the mechanistic view, the second methodological option 
above is preferable. That is, despite the difficulty of achieving ac-
curate prediction, we should indeed prioritize it over explanation. 
Moreover, paradoxically, in the difficult cases this priority for pre-
diction also turns out to be the only way to get explanations too. 
After that, I will then discuss the extent to which these conclusions 
generalize beyond the two examples.
3 Election prediction 1: polling aggregation
Successful election predictions are based on opinion polling, and the 
most successful predictors of all have been some aggregators of poll-
ing results. Take the 2012 US presidential election, in which Barack 
Obama defeated Mitt Romney. This campaign featured literally 
thousands of opinion polls. Famously, several aggregators correctly 
predicted the winner of all 51 states, as well as also getting Obama’s 
national vote share correct to within a few tenths of a percent.7 This 
is a stunning success, arguably with few equals in social science. Nor 
was it easy.8 On the morning of the election Romney’s odds at the 
7 Four of the most successful aggregators were: http://votamatic.org, http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/news/pollster/, http://election.princeton.edu/, and 
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/. The forecasting models for the first 
two of these were designed mainly by political science academics, the third by 
a neuroscience academic, and the last by a non-academic. Three of the four got 
every state right. Note: these predictions were from immediately beforehand; ac-
curacy diminishes the further in advance of an election that predictions are made.
8 See http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2012/11/war-on-nate-silver-final-af-
ter-action-report-the-flag-of-science-flies-uncontested-over-silvergrad-weblog-
ging.html for a list of 47 examples of failure, with an emphasis on their suspicion 
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bookmakers were 9/2, i.e. about 18%. Political futures markets such 
as InTrade put Romney’s chances at about 28%. These market prices 
imply that common opinion was surprised by the outcome.9
This success was not a fluke: the same poll aggregators have been 
successful in other elections too. And within any one election there 
have been many separate successful predictions, such as of individual 
Senate races or of margins of victory, which are at least partially 
independent of each other. Moreover, the aggregators’ methods are 
independently persuasive.
The predictions here were the result of two distinct stages: first, 
opinion polling itself; then second, aggregation of individual polls. 
Begin with the former. In any opinion poll, the voting intentions 
of a sample serve as a proxy for those of a population. How might 
things go wrong, such that the sample will not be representative? 
The most well-known way is random sampling error: small samples 
can lead to misleading flukes. The larger the sample, the less this is a 
problem. But more important are various forms of sampling bias, i.e. 
of systematic sampling errors that (for a given sampling procedure) 
cannot be alleviated simply by increasing sample size.10 Awareness of 
of polling-based prediction.
9 There is an issue here about how we measure success in the case of proba-
bilistic predictions. After all, these market prices still made Obama favorite, so 
why should we term them ‘surprised’ by his victory? In reply, besides the simple 
fact of the overall winner, there were also relevant additional facts: who won 
each state; and how much they won them by. Odds-makers were not impressive 
with respect to these more detailed targets. Indeed, barring unlikely background 
assumptions, the details of the state-level results are hard to reconcile with a 
28% chance of overall Romney victory. There is no serious dispute that the odds-
makers and many other predictors were not accurate. On the further matter of 
which poll aggregator did best, see: http://rationality.org/2012/11/09/was-na-
te-silver-the-most-accurate-2012-election-pundit/.
10 Lying in the background here are reference class issues. But given the 
unavoidable cognitive and epistemic constraints facing polling scientists, their 
choice of reference class is not arbitrary. And in practice the distinction between 
random and systematic sampling error is vital. Evidence of the latter’s impor-
tance: almost 25% even of late polls miss the final election result by more than 
their official confidence interval, yet the expected miss rate given random sam-
pling error alone should be only 5%. (http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-
the-fivethirtyeight-senate-forecast-model-works/)
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this crucial point lies at the heart of any serious election prediction. 
I’ll illustrate here with an especially notable source of sampling bias, 
namely balancing for demographic factors.11
Suppose, for example, that three-quarters of interviewees were 
women. Since there is good reason to think that women were dis-
proportionately likely to vote for Obama, it follows that such a wom-
an-heavy sample would give misleadingly pro-Obama predictions. 
This problem cannot be alleviated just by making the sample larger. 
Polling companies would therefore rebalance such a sample, in effect 
putting greater weight on men’s responses. Such rebalancing is un-
avoidable if we wish to predict accurately, and every polling company 
performs some version of it. Any poll’s headline figures are therefore 
heavily constructed. They are certainly not the raw survey results.
Exactly what rebalancing is required depends on assumptions 
about electoral turnout. For instance, in recent American presi-
dential elections typically there have been slightly fewer men than 
women voters, so it would be a mistake to rebalance the sample to 
exactly 50-50. The exact figure may not be obvious, it needing to 
be inferred from imperfect data about past elections, and moreover 
with some assessment of how patterns of turnout might change again 
in the upcoming election.12 Accordingly, different polling companies 
may reasonably choose slightly different rebalancing procedures. 
The result is the phenomenon of ‘house effects’, i.e. when a par-
ticular company’s results systematically favor one or other candidate 
compared to the industry average. When assessing the significance 
of a poll for election prediction, it is vital to be aware of this.
The rebalancing issue is pressing because it applies to many other 
factors besides gender, such as: age; income; race; likeliness to vote; 
education; ownership of cellphones but not landlines; and home ac-
cess to internet. Not only is the precise rebalancing procedure for 
each of these factors arguable, it is also arguable exactly which fac-
tors should be rebalanced for in the first place (Northcott 2015).
Turn now to the aggregation of polls, which represents a second 
layer of method quite distinct from that required to conduct a single 
11 Northcott 2015 briefly discusses some further sources.
12 Such rebalancing was behind the polling errors in both the 2015 and 2017 
UK general elections.
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poll. Historically, poll aggregation has had a better predictive record 
than using individual polls alone. One obvious reason is that aggre-
gation increases effective sample size and therefore reduces random 
sampling error. But it is not just that; it is also that sophisticated ag-
gregation can mitigate the other sources of error too. This explains 
why the best aggregators beat simple averaging of the polls. Some 
polls are worthy of greater epistemic weight than others. Unless 
election day is very close, demographic factors can improve on the 
predictions of polls alone. Historical evidence can inform how much 
regression to the mean to expect if one candidate is unexpectedly far 
ahead, or if they have received a polling bounce from their party’s 
convention. Some crucial issues during the 2012 campaign required 
such sophisticated analysis. Two prominent examples were: first, a 
persistent disagreement between state-level and national-level poll-
ing; and second, how likely it was the polls were wrong due to being 
systematically skewed against Romney. Neither of these issues could 
be addressed simply by taking a polling average, yet each was crucial 
to accurate prediction.13 In sum, polling aggregation is a skillful mat-
ter, which is why only a few managed it successfully.
4 Election prediction 2: fundamentals modelling
There is an alternative approach to election prediction, and one that 
corresponds to the mechanistic strategy that prioritizes explanation 
over prediction. In particular, a literature in political science focuses 
on ‘fundamentals’, i.e. on variables that might be relevant to elec-
tions in general and not just to particular cases. These variables in-
clude economic conditions, the perceived extremism of candidates, 
incumbency, and so forth.14 How does this literature fare?
Conveniently, it too has focused on US presidential elections. The 
sample size is relatively small, as fewer than 20 have good enough 
data. This creates a danger of overfitting. In response, models have 
typically featured only a small number of variables, most commonly 
13 See Northcott 2015 for detailed discussion.
14 Influential contributions include Fair 1978, Campbell and Wink 1990, Hibbs 
2000, Abramowitz 2008, and Lewis-Beck and Tien 2008. Montgomery et al 2012 
averages these and other models to achieve the best forecasting success of all.
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economic ones such as growth in GDP, jobs or real incomes.15 They 
are estimated on the basis of one part of the sample and then tested by 
tracking their predictive performance with respect to the rest of the 
sample. Even then, there remains a risk of overfitting: if a model pre-
dicts the first few out-of-sample elections quite well, will its success 
continue in future elections? Moreover, even if a model does success-
fully predict past elections, there is no guarantee the political envi-
ronment is so stable that the model will remain correct in future too.
These caveats noted, it is true that the models can show some pre-
dictive success. On one estimate, the best ones’ average error when 
predicting the incumbent party’s share of the vote is between 2 and 
3%.16 But this is not quite as impressive as it might sound: first, for 
our purposes it is something of a cheat, in that one of the variables in 
by far the highest weighted model—Abramowitz 2008—is a poll-
ing result, namely presidential approval rating. So the success is not 
achieved purely by fundamentals. Second, a 2–3% average error cor-
responds to an average error when estimating the gap between the 
leading two candidates of about 5%. And third, vote shares rarely 
deviate all that much from 50% anyway, so they are quite an easy tar-
get—indeed, another estimate is that economic variables account for 
only about 30–40% of the variance in incumbent party vote share.17 
Overall, the models do not predict individual election results very 
reliably. On many occasions they even get wrong the crude fact of 
which candidate won. For accurate prediction, it is necessary to in-
corporate the results of opinion polls.
Still, a primary motivation of the fundamentals literature, in keep-
ing with the mechanistic strategy generally, is to be able to provide 
explanations. Can we establish why Obama won? But unfortunately 
15 Literally thousands of economic variables could plausibly be deemed rel-
evant, not to mention many non-economic ones too. The risk of overfitting is one 
good reason to prioritize prediction over retrospective accommodation. There is a 
long established literature in philosophy of science on the relative epistemic merits 
generally of prediction versus accommodation, but I will not discuss that here.
16 See http://www.brendan-nyhan.com/blog/2011/11/a-comparison-of-
presidential-forecasting-models.html for discussion and references.
17 http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/a-radical-centrist-
view-on-election-forecasting/
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the fundamentals approach fails on this score too.
On the polling side, in a trivial sense Obama’s victory is ‘ex-
plained’ by the fact that, as revealed by aggregators, on the eve of the 
election a majority of the electorate were minded to vote for him. 
But, of course, for most investigative purposes a deeper explanation 
is required. Polling aggregation provides none.
On the fundamentals side, if its models had fared better they 
would have provided the very explanations that polling aggregation 
does not. After all, that is precisely the motivation for theory-cen-
tered methodology. Thus we might have been able to explain that 
Obama won because of, say, positive GDP and jobs statistics in the 
preceding two quarters. Unfortunately, though, the fundamentals 
models are not predictively accurate. And to explain requires iden-
tification of an event’s causes, which requires a verified theory or 
causal model, which in turn requires empirical warrant.18
Can the fundamentals models nevertheless provide us with expla-
nations anyway? The argument would be that they have truly identi-
fied relevant causes. It might be postulated, for instance, that GDP 
or stock market growth does causally impact on voter preferences 
and thus on election outcomes. True, other causes impact too and 
so the models do not explain the outcomes fully nor predict them 
accurately, but that still leaves room for the claim that they explain 
them ‘partially’ by correctly identifying some of the causes present.19
But, alas, even this weaker claim is dubious here. First, the differ-
ent models cite different variables. Abramowitz’s, for instance, cites 
GDP growth, presidential approval rating, and a complex treatment 
of incumbency; Hibbs’s though cites growth in real disposable income 
and the number of military fatalities abroad. Even among economic 
variables alone, some models cite GDP, some household incomes, 
some jobs data, some stock market performance, and so on, each 
with different combinations of lags. At heart, there are many dif-
ferent ways to achieve roughly the same limited predictive success, 
which shakes our faith that any one way has isolated the true causal 
18 Following the literatures under consideration here, I focus on causal expla-
nation. I do not mean to rule out the possibility of other forms of explanation.
19 See Northcott 2012 and Northcott 2013 for more on the relevant sense of 
partial explanation.
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drivers of election results. Perhaps the small sample size relative to 
the number of plausible variables makes this problem insoluble.
A second reason for pessimism is that, elsewhere in science, a stan-
dard response to such predictive failure is to test putative causes in 
isolation. As it were, at least we achieve predictive success in the iso-
lated test. But unfortunately such experiments are impossible in the 
field case of election predictions. So as well as predictive failure at the 
level of elections as a whole, the causal factors picked out by the mod-
els have not earned their empirical keep by any other means either.
The upshot is that we have no warrant even for partial causes of 
election outcomes, and therefore no warrant even for partial expla-
nations. Thus the basic conclusion stands: we have not achieved any 
explanation of election outcomes, and so the original motivation for 
turning to fundamentals models is frustrated.
5 Weather forecasting
On the face of it, the Earth’s weather might seem an unlikely object 
of predictive success. It has long been thought a chaotic system, in 
other words that outcomes are indefinitely sensitive to exact initial 
conditions (Lorenz 1969). More recently, it has also been convinc-
ingly argued that weather predictions are (often) also indefinitely 
sensitive to model errors—that is, even tiny inaccuracies in a model 
can lead to very large errors in the predictions made by that model 
(Frigg et al 2014). These are obviously major challenges for predic-
tion. Yet, despite them, weather forecasting accuracy has improved 
significantly over recent decades.20 Hurricane paths are predicted 
more accurately and further ahead, and temperature and rainfall 
predictions are more accurate too. Overall, the reliability of seven-
day forecasts now is equal to that of three-day forecasts 20 years ago 
(Bechtold et al 2012).21 What explains this tremendous progress?
There are several factors. One is the huge improvement in the qual-
ity and quantity of weather data, stemming initially from the launch of 
20 Throughout, I will use the terms “prediction” and “forecast” interchangeably.
21 I will concentrate on the work of the European Centre for Medium-Range 
Weather Forecasts (ECMWF), but similar remarks apply to other weather fore-
casters too.
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the first weather satellites in the 1960s. There are now temperature, 
humidity and other reports of ever greater refinement both horizon-
tally (currently increments of 20km squares) and vertically (currently 
91 separate altitude layers). Over 10 million observations per day are 
inputted into the ECMWF’s calculations. A second source of prog-
ress has been the huge increase in available computing power. This 
has enabled ever more complex models to be used, ever more simula-
tions to be run, and thus the huge improvements in the available data 
to be properly exploited. A third source of progress has been in the 
models of the weather themselves, which are used to make the pre-
dictions (see shortly). Finally, a fourth source has been improvement 
in analytical methods. Perhaps the most significant of these followed 
on from the introduction of stochastic terms in the basic model in the 
late 1990s: this allowed an ensemble method of forecasting to be adopted.22 
Multiple simulations are run—in the case of the ECMWF, currently 
about 50.23 These are then used to generate probabilistic forecasts.24
The use of the ensemble method is particularly significant because 
it is the main way in which forecasters have overcome the problem of 
chaos. In particular, although any one forecast inevitably risks going 
seriously askew because of an arbitrarily small error in the inputted 
initial conditions, it has been found from experience that, as in many 
chaotic systems, these errors ‘cancel out’ over many iterations. That 
is, the errors are not systematically in one particular direction, and 
so the probabilistic forecasts derived from an ensemble of forecasts 
are not biased.
These sources of progress have interacted with each other. For 
instance, the increase in data and computing power have enabled the 
22 Other analytical innovations include new forms of bias correction, which ac-
count for fluctuations in instrument calibration and enhance consistency between 
diverse types of observation—for instance, data from all of satellites, sea buoys, and 
conventional ground stations. Another important component is the balance struck 
between observation and background errors. These errors exhibit significant varia-
tions between observation types and locations. The balance struck between them 
determines the weight given to observations in the analysis (Bechtold et al 2012).
23 The variety on which the ensemble works is generated not just by the model 
uncertainty introduced by stochastic terms in the model, but also by data uncertainty.
24 A similar ensemble method is also used by leading polling aggregators.
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development of more sophisticated models, the exploitation of which 
is constrained by the need to run the required number of simulations 
quickly enough to generate timely forecasts. Indeed the ensemble 
method of forecasting, notwithstanding its desirability, was simply 
not feasible until sufficient computing power became available. Mean-
while the needs of the model, and in particular knowledge from ex-
perience of what data improvements would most improve the accura-
cy of the model’s predictions, in turn influence the gathering of data, 
such as the choice of instruments to be included on new satellites.
Turn now in more detail to the remaining source of progress, 
namely the improvements in the weather model itself.25 At the heart 
of these models are differential equations that have been known for 
hundreds of years, namely Newton’s laws of fluid dynamics. These 
are assumed to govern the fiendishly complex movements of air in 
the atmosphere, and how those are impacted by temperature, pres-
sure, the Earth’s rotation, the cycle of night and day, and so on. So 
far as is known, this ‘fundamental’ theory remains a true description 
of the weather system (or at least as approximately true as any other 
Newtonian model). However, in practice it is not sufficient to gener-
ate accurate weather forecasts. Moreover, refining the model from first 
principles has not proved to be an effective way to remedy this situ-
ation. Rather, a whole series of additions have had to be made to the 
model that reflect various sui generis factors. More to the point, the 
exact form that these additions should take is under-determined by 
fundamental theory. Instead, many different forms have been tried, 
and the ones adopted have been determined by a trial-and-error pro-
cess. In particular, the huge amount of weather data now becomes an 
important epistemic advantage because it is possible to test various 
tweaks on a vast archive of past data, as well as to test which tweak 
predicts best on new data. In this respect, the weather forecasters 
have it much easier than the election predictors, who were restricted 
to just 20 or so data points of past presidential elections.
There is a cost to this method though, familiar already from the 
elections case—although these changes to the model have greatly 
25 Much of the following is taken from the discussions of the ECMWF model 
in Bechtold et al 2008 and Jung et al 2010, as well as from personal communica-
tion with Roberto Buizza, Head of the Predictability Division at ECMWF.
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improved predictive accuracy, they have come at the cost of explana-
tory transparency. The reason is the usual one for purely predictive 
models, namely the deviation from well-established theoretical un-
derpinnings. The various tweaks mean that there is no longer a war-
ranted causal interpretation for each term in the model. Mathemati-
cally, the main differential equations now feature an extra term, not 
derived from theory, to represent new factors. The point is that the 
forms of these extra terms are not given by theory; rather, they are 
determined empirically, i.e. by whichever form gives the best pre-
dictive results. The same is true of deciding whether a particular fac-
tor should be incorporated into the model at all—sometimes, such 
as with ocean coupling (see shortly), theoretically well-motivated 
and initially promising innovations have eventually been dropped 
because they did not pay their way predictively.
In order to predict successfully, weather modelers must be aware 
of a huge range of detailed meteorological factors over and above 
the basic laws of fluid dynamics. Here are a couple of examples for 
illustration. First, consider mountains. These are well known to in-
fluence atmospheric circulation and to have large local effects on air 
flow and precipitation, both around mountains themselves and in 
surrounding areas. So it was realized in the early 2000s that intro-
ducing a term for the effect of mountains could potentially improve 
the model. The question was how exactly to do this. To work that 
out, it was necessary to move beyond theory:
[One version of the model] included a ‘cutoff’ or ‘effective’ mountain 
height in the computation of gravity wave drag from the SSO scheme 
[i.e. the scheme to represent mountains]. The more physically realis-
tic cutoff mountain height resulted in a decrease in gravity wave drag 
(GWD), reducing the excessive deceleration of flow over the Hima-
layas and Rocky Mountains ... However, climate runs showed an in-
crease in the positive zonal wind bias over winter northern hemisphere 
mid-latitudes, suggesting that the reduction in GWD had been exces-
sive. This problem was solved [in the next version of the model] by 
doubling the ‘cutoff’ mountain height and thereby increasing the am-
plitude of the gravity waves ‘generated’ by the SSO scheme by a factor 
of two. (Jung et al 2010: 9)26
26 The page references here and elsewhere in this section are to the versions of 
the papers published as ECMWF Technical Reports.
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Notice the sequence here: the less physically realistic formulation was 
the one eventually adopted, because it generated more accurate fore-
casts. That is, predictive fit trumped causal understanding. Instead, 
the role of causal understanding was a heuristic one—to suggest fac-
tors to be considered, in this case the impact on air flows of moun-
tains. Exactly how those factors were best incorporated could not be 
derived from theory but instead was determined, in instrumentalist 
style, by brute predictive efficacy.
It is a similar story when considering whether a factor should 
be incorporated at all. Again, theory suggests—but prediction de-
cides. Consider ‘ocean coupling’. This refers, roughly speaking, to 
the way in which the ocean and atmosphere work together to trans-
fer heat from the tropics to polar regions and also to influence the 
circulation of fresh and salt water. Key elements are the exchange 
of heat between sea and atmosphere, and the impact of ocean cur-
rents. Naturally, weather modelers sought to incorporate these ap-
parently significant processes. But it was found that ‘results from 
climate simulations [that incorporated ocean coupling] are similar 
but slightly “worse” with respect to observations compared to the 
uncoupled simulations. Therefore, only results from the uncoupled 
simulations are shown’ (Bechtold et al 2012: 22).27 That is, a theo-
retical improvement was rejected on empirical grounds. This is the 
opposite of the mechanists’ methodological recommendation; prior-
ity was given instead to improving predictive accuracy.
This pattern is general. For instance, another factor suggested by 
theory, which is being investigated at the moment, is the role of sea 
ice. But exactly how this should be incorporated into the model, or 
whether it should be incorporated at all, will be determined entirely 
by empirical considerations. Similar remarks apply to many other 
features, such as vertical diffusion, soil hydrology, clouds, vegeta-
tion, and ocean waves.
So the notable progress in weather forecasting over recent de-
cades has not come from any improvement in fundamental theory, 
i.e. Newton’s fluid dynamics, which indeed remains unchanged. 
27 Weather forecasters often refer to their models as ‘climate’ simulations. 
Nevertheless their focus is strictly on predicting weather, not on the long-term 
processes that are the focus of climate science.
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 10/25/18 4:12 PM
647When are Purely Predictive Models Best?
Rather, it has been driven by relentlessly prioritizing predictive suc-
cess even at the expense of explanatory transparency. The commer-
cial imperative to generate accurate forecasts above all else, has fo-
cused minds methodologically.
Return now to the issue of model error. Recall: even minuscule 
errors in a model can lead to quickly escalating errors in that model’s 
predictions. So how can this danger be averted, given that weather 
forecasters’ current models are clearly not literally true and there-
fore are in error in the relevant sense? A purely theoretical solution is 
unavailable. The answer instead is a further advertisement for brute 
emphasis on predictive accuracy above all else. Simply put, many 
different versions of a model, including different stochastic adjust-
ments, are tested against the empirical data. The ones selected are 
those that, as a matter of fact, predict best. This method has proven 
effective at avoiding the problem of model error—simply pick those 
models whose errors of representation turn out not to lead to errors 
of prediction.
An important methodological feature in weather forecasting is 
the holistic nature of its empirical testing. Particular tweaks are made 
to a model, and these are then tested by checking the model’s overall 
predictive success. The reason is the presumed ubiquity of interac-
tive effects: a tweak to the model might have one effect now but then 
a very different effect (or no effect) once other parts of the model 
are altered. Experience has suggested that such instability of effect is 
common. ‘It is very difficult to understand how exactly changes in 
model formulation affect the climate of the model’ (Jung et al 2010: 
13). As a result, in practice it is impossible reliably to predict what 
the impact will be of a particular tweak. Rather, only testing can 
reveal the answer in any particular case.
This militates against causal inference, and so it is much more 
difficult for the weather forecasting models to give explanations than 
it is for them to give predictions. In this respect, their situation re-
sembles that of the polling aggregators. (It also resembles that of the 
designers of some economic auctions—Alexandrova and Northcott 
2009.) A (causal) explanation requires the claim that things would 
have been different if a particular factor had been different; but ho-
listic prediction cannot license such detailed counterfactual claims.
In the weather case though, more so than in the election or 
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auction cases, it seems there might be some partial exceptions to 
this ‘no explanations’ conclusion. At root, what makes these possible 
is the exceptional quantity of data available. I mention only one of 
these exceptions briefly here (taken from Jung et al 2010; see that 
paper and also Bechtold et al 2008 for more details and examples): 
there have been extensive recent changes to the model’s treatment of 
convection schemes in the tropics and to its treatment of the radia-
tive properties of ice clouds. These changes have of course been thor-
oughly tested for their impact on predictive success and refined ac-
cordingly. But in addition, the data allowed modelers to test whether 
the two changes composed non-linearly or not. In this case, it was 
found that the non-linear—i.e. interactive—effects were relatively 
small. Accordingly, particular improvements in overall predictions 
now could justifiably be attributed to particular changes to the mod-
el. (I return to this issue in section 8 below.)
6 Prediction versus explanation revisited
Consider the following schematic table:
Explanation No explanation
Successful prediction Slot 1: Newtonian 
cannonball
Slot 2: polling aggregation, 
weather forecasting
Unsuccessful prediction Slot 3: (Empty) Slot 4: fundamentals election pre-
diction, much actual social science?
In Slot 1 in the table are the happy cases where we achieve the best 
of both worlds, such as when a causal model predicts accurately and 
thereby also causally explains. Successful cases of idealization, such 
as the Newtonian cannonball, fall into this category.
In Slot 2 are cases where we achieve predictive success, but only 
purely predictive success—i.e. when the methods and models re-
quired to achieve predictive success are such that they do not yield 
generalizable explanations. Examples discussed in this paper are 
polling aggregation and weather forecasting.
In Slot 4 are cases where we get the worst of both worlds, i.e. 
no prediction and no explanation either. The fundamentals election 
models fall into this category: they offer causal models but their lack 
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of empirical success means we have no warrant for them. Moreover, 
given the practical impossibility of testing the individual causes in 
isolation, it is not possible to warrant even the claim that they ex-
plain partially.
In Slot 3 are cases of explanation without prediction. None of 
our examples fits this description. I will argue now that that is no 
coincidence—this slot remains empty generally. The reason is that, 
according to all prevailing theories of explanation in philosophy of 
science, explanatory success requires empirical success. In particu-
lar, causal explanation requires true (or approximately true) identifi-
cation of causes present. What can be the warrant for such identifica-
tion? In science, it must be empirical success. The most convincing 
proof of such success in turn is successful prediction—or at least 
it is in cases where there exist many competing models and much 
scope for after-the-fact rationalization, which covers many cases of 
claimed “empirical success” in social science (Northcott and Alexan-
drova 2015) and arguably in field sciences generally.
Admittedly, there are two important caveats here. First, in other 
cases it may be that explanations can also gain warrant from empiri-
cal success achieved retrospectively (section 7). In those cases, Slot 
3 is only empty if we understand “unsuccessful prediction” broadly 
as referring not only to forward-looking prediction but also to after-
the-fact “retrodiction” too.
Second, care should be taken in interpreting “unsuccessful pre-
diction” in another way as well. Sometimes a model may not predict 
accurately because of the influence of unmodeled disturbing causes, 
yet it may nevertheless still have truly identified some of the causes 
present, thus achieving partial explanation. But in such cases we still 
must have warrant for thinking that these causes are truly identified, 
and if that warrant doesn’t come from successful prediction in the 
case at hand then it must come from somewhere else. In experimen-
tal sciences, controlled experiments elsewhere give us the needed 
warrant to believe that particular causes or mechanisms are present 
and behaving in the way our models suggest. But in field sciences 
such warrant is frequently absent.28 That leaves us with no success-
28 To be sure, in recent decades there has been a growth industry of controlled 
experiments in economics and other fields. In principle, these might provide just 
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 10/25/18 4:12 PM
Robert Northcott650
ful predictions of any sort, either of the situation at hand or of other 
relevant cases. This was precisely the problem with the fundamen-
tals models of election prediction, and it leaves us stuck in Slot 4 
with neither prediction nor explanation.29 Thus, if “prediction” is 
interpreted broadly to mean “prediction somewhere” (i.e. to include 
relevant testing of proposed mechanisms by experiments in contexts 
other than the present one), then Slot 3 is necessarily empty. No 
empirical success, no explanation.
In this light, what can the method of Galilean idealization, or of 
prioritizing mechanistic explanation over mere prediction (under-
stood broadly as per the above), achieve? The answer is: a place in 
either Slot 1 or Slot 4, i.e. either both of prediction and explanation 
or neither of them. In the happy cases where predictive success is 
achieved, that means Slot 1, and all is fine. But when predictive suc-
cess is not achieved, that means Slot 4. Yet Slot 4 is obviously inferior 
to Slot 2, which at least offers prediction even if still no explanation. 
The real problem is the misguided belief that, by focusing on theory 
and mechanisms, we can at least ensure that we reach Slot 3 even if 
we don’t achieve Slot 1, i.e. that we can at least achieve explanation 
even without empirical success. But this is to put the cart before the 
horse, and is how the idea that models can be explanatory without 
empirical success can become a harmful illusion. In a mistaken pur-
suit of Slot 3, we condemn ourselves to Slot 4 even though Slot 2 
may still be achievable. That is, in fruitlessly pursuing explanation 
without prediction, we unnecessarily forego what may actually be 
achievable, namely prediction without explanation.
In sum, empirically successful models are always best, and what-
ever modelling strategy yields them is the one we have to follow. And 
when are purely predictive models best? Answer: when otherwise 
empirical success is unobtainable. Something is better than nothing.
the needed empirical warrant. In practice though, the problem of external valid-
ity has often hindered that (Northcott and Alexandrova 2015).
29 Arguably, this problem is widespread. See Northcott and Alexandrova 
2013 for an argument to this effect with respect to economics.
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7 Historical explanation30
If we understand prediction narrowly to refer only to claims about 
future events then explanation is possible without it—because, as 
mentioned, sometimes it can be achieved by historical analysis too. 
Even if I failed to predict beforehand that I would win my tennis 
match, say, still I might successfully be able to explain my win af-
terwards by noting that my opponent got injured halfway through.
In response, note again that empirical success is still necessary 
for explanation. In particular, in the case of causal explanation, true 
identification of a relevant cause is necessary—if my opponent had 
not got injured, and if that injury had not caused their defeat, my 
explanation would have been incorrect.
Whether the empirical success is via predictions before the fact or 
via historical analysis after it, the interesting issue, methodologically 
speaking, remains: how do we achieve such success? Return to our 
two case studies, beginning with elections. How might we explain 
election results after the fact? Not by appeal to the fundamentals 
models, for the reason pointed out earlier: there is no warrant for 
claiming they have truly identified even some of the causes of elec-
tion outcomes. An alternative is after-the-fact questionnaires, when 
voters are asked why they voted as they did. Certainly, these are 
potentially good evidence for explanations of an election result, al-
though they do come with a couple of caveats: first, people’s answers 
to such questionnaires are often unreliable. (Indeed, questionnaire 
answers are often inconsistent with recorded vote totals.) Second, 
so far at least, explanations drawn from such questionnaires have 
lacked generalizability: no one has been able to construct from them 
a model with significant predictive power for elections in general, 
as opposed to constructing after-the-fact explanations, varying each 
time, for particular cases.
Another approach is to use demographics. In the context of 
American presidential elections, the ambition is to explain election 
outcomes in particular states (and nationally) by reference to those 
states’ population profiles with respect to ethnicity, wealth, levels 
30 I thank the editors and an anonymous referee for pressing me on the issues 
in this section.
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of education, and so on. As mentioned, such demographic variables 
do add predictive value several months ahead of time, although polls 
dominate them by the time of the election date itself. But can demo-
graphic models help with explanation? To a degree, yes—and that 
degree is precisely the degree to which their empirical success can 
be established. For example, comparing election results in different 
American states in effect offers the possibility of a natural experi-
ment. With due care, it can therefore be established that, say, the 
different percentage of black Democratic voters in Wisconsin and 
South Carolina explains a certain amount of the difference in Clin-
ton’s vote share in those two states during her 2016 primary cam-
paign against Sanders.31
In the weather forecasting example, by contrast, it is hard to see 
any generalizable explanations beyond those limited ones inferable 
from the forecasting models (section 8 below).
Where does this leave us? I think with two conclusions, both 
of which reiterate the paper’s main claims. First, explanation does 
require empirical success, but this success can sometimes take the 
form of retrospective accommodations as well as future predictions. 
If “prediction” is interpreted broadly in this way, Slot 3 remains emp-
ty. The second conclusion is methodological: an emphasis on the de-
velopment of theories and mechanisms is often a poor way to achieve 
this empirical success. In such cases, purely predictive models are 
best, although sometimes case-specific historical explanations might 
also be available. That said, in other cases theory may obtain suf-
ficient empirical success to warrant explanations or at least partial 
explanations after all—one example is demographic analysis of elec-
tions. Still, even then they only do so thanks to empirical success, in 
other words Slot 3 again remains empty.
8 Coda: in further defense of prediction
Sometimes there may even be scope for moving from Slot 2 to Slot 
31 Note that this would yield only a partial explanation of the primary results, 
since it identifies only one cause of them. Moreover the explanation is a little 
imprecise, both because the definition of a ‘black’ voter is imprecise and because 
the impact of ethnicity on voting patterns is not completely stable across states.
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1, i.e. for a purely predictive model also to generate explanations. 
At the end of section 6, I mentioned a couple of examples of this 
in the weather forecasting case, or at least of tentative steps in that 
direction. If the quantity of data is high, then it is more possible to 
run natural experiments in order to test non-holistically the impact 
of particular parts of a model. In such cases we may indeed acquire 
warrant for certain causal—and thus explanatory—claims, and we 
would be moving into Slot 1.
Being in Slot 1, the predictive model would no longer be purely 
predictive. But the point is the route by which Slot 1 is reached. It 
is only by an initial methodological prioritization of prediction that 
sufficient empirical success is achieved to enable the subsequent gen-
eration also of explanations. To go for explanation straightaway, by 
sticking to a model with well-known mechanistic operation even in 
the face of predictive shortfall, would be exactly the wrong path, 
analogous to the case of the fundamentals models of elections. We 
need to be prepared to depart from established theory in the service 
of prediction as ultimately this turns out to be the only hope in these 
cases also of achieving explanation too.
Such a methodological approach reflects the heuristic view of 
models mentioned in section 2, according to which theory alone 
should not be seen as providing models that can be confirmed and 
generate explanations. Instead, the role of theory is merely to sug-
gest inputs for the extra-theoretical—usually empirical and case-
specific—work needed to generate eventual causal hypotheses. 
Accordingly, the initial theoretical models themselves are not ex-
planatory; rather, what might be explanatory are the independent 
extra-theoretical “models” that eventually result (Alexandrova 2008, 
Alexandrova and Northcott 2009). Weather forecasting is a fine ex-
ample of this.32
There are also two additional senses in which even purely predic-
tive models can sometimes do more than merely predict. The first 
is that they often license successful interventions—and thus causal 
32 Some, such as Kuorikoski and Ylikoski (2015), see even heuristic models as in-
directly explanatory to a degree. Perhaps. But regardless of one’s preferred seman-
tics of “explanatory”, the key point of difference here remains, since Kuorikoski and 
Ylikoski still support a methodological emphasis on explanation over prediction.
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knowledge of a kind. One example of this is the many instances of 
chemotherapy where the mechanism is unknown but the efficacy is 
well established. Another example, already mentioned, is economic 
auctions, and in particular the well-studied case of government-run 
spectrum auctions (Guala 2005, Alexandrova 2008), where the suc-
cess of the auction design is well established even though the holistic 
nature of the pre-testing required to generate that design means we 
have no detailed mechanistic explanation of the auctioneers’ success.
True enough, in both the chemotherapy and auction cases extrap-
olation of the models to new applications is sadly difficult, requiring 
much fresh laborious work each time (Alexandrova and Northcott 
2009). This is the disadvantage of being in Slot 2 rather than Slot 1: 
the predictive success is not easily generalizable. Nevertheless, es-
pecially in the auctions case, predictive success in one application 
has enabled success in some new applications to come at least a little 
more easily.
Indeed, a similar story applies in the election case too: the poll-
ing aggregators’ success in one election did generalize to other elec-
tions—to some degree. Admittedly though, the case-specific nature 
of polling aggregation means that a serious aggregator must build a 
new election prediction model each time, and as a result, although 
sometimes the aggregators were again successful, a first success did 
not guarantee a second (Northcott 2015).
Nevertheless, overall the point is that sometimes some of the ben-
efits of Slot 1 can be achieved, albeit imperfectly and more labori-
ously, by going via Slot 2: in the case of weather forecasting some 
degree of explanation, and in the other cases some degree of gen-
eralizability. The common feature is that such benefits as do accrue 
rest crucially on predictive success. This remains the foundation for 
everything else. For this reason, reaching Slot 1 via Slot 2 remains 
superior to doomed attempts to progress via Slot 3. In other words, 
when our models are not predictively accurate, just refining those 
models according to theoretical criteria is an unpromising strategy. 
In these cases, progress can only be made by the hard empirical work 
of improving predictions instead. That is when purely predictive 
models are best.33
33 I am grateful for helpful feedback from two anonymous referees and from 
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